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This paper studies whether an increase in women’s intrahousehold bargaining power causes couples to
allocate more resources to their child’s education, and, if so, what the underlying mechanisms for this
might be. We conduct a between-subject lab experiment with couples and vary the relative bargaining
power between spouses. The paper provides two main insights. First, increasing the wife’s bargaining
power improves gender equality in allocation to children’s education. However, it does not increase the
amount invested in the child’s education. Second, we show that the difference in time preferences between
spouses matters for how much the household invests in the child’s education. It benefits the child that the
most patient spouse has more relative bargaining power. This implies that increasing the wife’s bargaining
power may reduce the allocation to the child’s education if she is the less patient spouse. The results
provide new insights into the current debate on female empowerment, and highlight the importance of
incorporating a broader set of preferences in the analysis of intrahousehold decision-making.
INTRODUCTION
Since the UN Millennium Development Goals were launched in the year 2000, there has
been an increased focus on female empowerment in international development aid
strategies. Female empowerment is undoubtedly a goal of great intrinsic importance, but
the policy debate has also focused on other reasons for empowering women. In
particular, it has been argued that female empowerment increases women’s
intrahousehold bargaining power which in turn increases spending on goods and services
that benefit children (see, for example, Thomas 1990, 1993; Attanasio and Lechene 2002;
Duflo 2003; Gitter and Barham (2008); Browning et al. 2014). The assumed positive
externalities of female empowerment are also reflected in implemented policies; most
conditional cash transfer programmes that aim to improve living conditions for children
target women (Fiszbein and Schady 2009).
The empirical and theoretical evidence for the positive effect of an increase in
women’s bargaining power on spending on children is, however, mixed. In this paper, we
present evidence from a novel lab experiment with a between-subject design focusing on
household investments in children’s education. We exogenously vary the spouses’ control
over money and use this as a proxy for relative bargaining power between the husband
and the wife in the experiment. The design allows us to causally identify whether an
increase in the wife’s bargaining power affects how much a couple allocates to one of
their children’s education. We shed light on the underlying mechanisms by investigating
the role of time and risk preferences, and the gender of the child, factors that have
received less attention in the household decision-making literature.
The experiment was conducted with 287 married couples in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
The main outcome of interest is how the couples distribute a fixed endowment between
the wife, the husband, and one of their children in primary school. The amount allocated
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to the child is an investment in his or her education in the form of tutoring. We
exogenously vary the wife’s control over the allocation in four experimental treatments.
The first treatment is a dictator game where the husband is the dictator and makes the
allocation decision. The second and third treatments are Rubinstein shrinking-pie
bargaining games; the husband makes the first proposal for the allocation decision in the
second treatment, and the wife makes the first proposal in the third treatment
(Rubinstein 1982). Finally, the fourth treatment is a dictator game where the wife is the
dictator and makes the allocation decision. The treatments are designed to capture
variation in the wife’s bargaining power. In the first treatment, the husband has complete
bargaining power. In the second and third treatments, the bargaining power is shared
between the spouses. In the fourth treatment, the wife has complete bargaining power.
The remainder of this paper refers to control over money as bargaining power. However,
we acknowledge that ‘bargaining power’ is a broad term and that control over money
captures only part of it.
Studying household decision-making in a lab experiment allows us to tightly control
the factors influencing decisions. Thus we can cleanly identify causal effects, and study
the importance of time and risk preferences for household investments in children’s
education. However, the lab methodology also has some important drawbacks. First, the
decision-making situation in the lab might be very different from how households usually
make decisions about children’s education. Second, the recruitment procedure may have
given rise to a selection bias. We discuss these threats to the external validity, that is, the
degree to which our findings can be generalized to other settings and samples, in the third
subsection of Section IV.
The paper offers two main insights. First, increasing the wife’s bargaining power
improves gender equality among the children, but does not increase the amount invested
in the child’s education. These findings shed new light on how an increase in the wife’s
bargaining power affects intrahousehold decision-making. Second, we find that the effect
of an increase in bargaining power depends on the difference in time preferences between
spouses. When the wife is less patient than the husband, giving her full bargaining power
decreases the allocation to the child’s education by 11.5 percentage points compared to
when the husband has full bargaining power. When the wife is as patient or more patient
than the husband, giving her full bargaining power increases the share allocated to the
child’s education by 7.7 percentage points. These findings show the importance of time
preferences in the decision-making process in the household.
Our study relates to the growing literature on the role of women’s bargaining power
in household decision-making in developing countries. Earlier empirical studies such as
Thomas (1990, 1993), Kennedy and Peters (1992), Case and Deaton (1998), Phipps and
Burton (1998), and Doss (2006) generally find positive correlations between survey
measures of bargaining power (wife’s education, earnings, or assets at marriage) and
children’s welfare (clothes, food, nutrition, education, health and childcare). However,
Thomas (1990, 1993) finds no evidence of men and women spending income differently
when they both have earnings. As Duflo (2012) points out, these correlations do not
imply causation and might be misleading.1 To overcome this problem, researchers have
used natural experiments that exogenously change women’s bargaining power. A seminal
paper by Lundberg et al. (1997) uses a change in the recipient of child benefits in the UK
(from men to women) and finds that after the change, a larger budget share is spent on
women’s and children’s clothing. Chou et al. (2010), on the other hand, use the
expansion of the school system in Taiwan and do not find any differences in the effects of
men’s and women’s education on children’s health.
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In the last two decades, a large strand of the household decision-making literature
has focused on studying cash transfer programmes. For instance, Attanasio and Lechene
(2002, 2010) and Rubalcava et al. (2009) find that conditional cash transfers to women in
Mexico (Oportunidades) increase the family’s budget share spent on food and children’s
clothing. However, because the transfers were given to women only, these studies do not
shed light on the importance of the receiver’s gender for spending on children. To
overcome this problem, Bobonis (2009) uses rainfall shocks as an instrument for changes
in household income. He finds that increases in household income caused by rainfall
shocks have a smaller effect on expenditures on children’s goods compared to cash
transfers targeted to women in Oportunidades, which the author interprets as evidence for
women devoting more of their earnings to meet collective consumption needs.
Recent randomized controlled trials (RCTs) that exogenously vary the gender of the
cash transfer recipient generally find that cash transfers cause an improvement in child
outcomes, but do not identify differential effects for transfers given to women and
transfers given to men (Benhassine et al. 2015; Akresh et al. 2016; Haushofer and
Shapiro 2016). An exception is a study by Armand et al. (2020) who find that women
spend significantly more on food (especially meat, fish and dairy products) than men.
Importantly, the RCT-based studies do not shed light on whether the null effects of
gender of recipient are because (i) the cash transfers were not large enough to change
relative bargaining power, or (ii) men and women have similar preferences about
investments in children. The present study sheds light on which of the two reasons is
more likely, and provides evidence for other underlying mechanisms that can explain
investments in children’s education.
Another related strand of the household decision-making literature uses lab experiments
to test household models, including efficiency and cooperation within the household.
Iversen et al. (2011), Kebede et al. (2014), Munro et al. (2014), and Bjorvatn et al. (2020)
use public good games and find that the wife contributes less to the common pool than the
husband does. In these studies, the wife’s decision reduces the household income more than
the husband’s decision does. Similarly, Castilla and Walker (2013) and Hoel (2015) find
evidence of inefficiencies and hiding of income when the wife is the decision-maker. Jakiela
and Ozier (2016) find that women are willing to conceal their initial endowment, even
though it reduces their potential earnings in the experiment. This literature suggests that
women do not always make choices that are in the best interest of the household.
Moreover, a seminal paper by Ashraf (2009) shows that when women control household
savings, men are more likely to keep money for themselves when choices are non-
observable, and commit money for private consumption when choices are observable. We
contribute to this literature by cleanly identifying the causal effect of an increase in female
bargaining power on couples’ investments in their children’s education, conducting, to our
knowledge, the first lab experiment where the outcome is real investments in children. We
also provide novel insights into how spouses’ time and risk preferences, and the gender of
the child, shape couples’ decisions and interact with relative bargaining power.
Finally, our study relates to the theoretical household literature. Household models
provide different predictions for how the provision of public goods (in our case,
investments in children) is influenced by a change in relative bargaining power.
Historically, the most commonly used category is the unitary model, where the
household’s preferences are represented by a utility function without any explicit process
aggregating the preferences of the spouses (Samuelson 1956; Becker 1991). Thus this
model does not provide any prediction of how a change in relative bargaining power
affects household decision-making. Cooperative models, such as bargaining models
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(Manser and Brown 1980; Lundberg and Pollak 1996) and the collective model (Chiappori
1988, 1992), predict that an increase in the wife’s bargaining power (weakly) increases the
provision of the public good if the wife cares more about the public good than the
husband does. Non-cooperative models (Ulph 2006; Browning et al. 2009) have
ambiguous predictions that depend on the wife’s initial bargaining power; an increase in
the wife’s bargaining power might reduce the provision of the public good.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the experimental design, and
Section II discusses the empirical strategy. Section III provides the results, and Section IV
discusses the results and limitation of the study design. Finally, Section V concludes.
I. SAMPLE AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Sample and setting
The experiment was conducted with 287 couples in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The
couples were recruited by distribution of invitation letters to pupils in four different
primary schools in a relatively poor ward (see Online Appendix D.1). The couples signed
up for the study by returning a slip with their name and contact information to their
child’s teacher. They were then called by one of the research assistants to schedule a
session. We discuss the issue of potential selection biases of our recruitment strategy in
the third subsection of Section IV.
Each spouse received a TZS5000 show-up fee (approx. USD2.3), and had the
opportunity to earn more during the experiment. All sessions took place in the afternoon
between 1 pm and 5 pm, and each session consisted of between 15 and 30 couples. On
average, each household earned TZS40,000 (approx. USD18.6), including the show-up
fee. This corresponded to more than two days’ worth of wages for low-paying jobs
(Africapay 2018). In addition, we provided one child in each household with an average
of 3.4 weeks of tutoring (worth TSZ17,000/USD7.8).
Table 1 provides background characteristics for participants by gender. The average
participant is close to 39 years old, and the men are on average eight years older than the
women. The couples care for an average of 3.2 children, of whom 1.4 are in primary
school. Comparing our sample to the Tanzania Demographic Household Survey (DHS),
we find that the households in our sample are larger than the average household in urban
Tanzania (5.2 members versus 4.3 members) (Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics
2016, p. 37). This suggests that our sample can be considered as relatively poor. Most of
the respondents have completed primary school or a higher level of education. Men are
more educated than women. In addition, there are large gender differences in
employment status. While 41% of women report being unemployed, only 5% of men do
the same. Our data on education and occupation are not comparable to the DHS.
Experimental setup and conditions
The sequence of events is described in Figure 1. At arrival, we conduct a background
survey, with both spouses present. Couples are subsequently randomized to one of the
four treatments, and the husband and the wife are placed in separate rooms according to
their treatment. They then face three incentivized tasks. All the tasks are choices of how
to allocate a monetary endowment. To illustrate the choice environment, the participants
receive laminated pictures of TZS500 and TZS1000 notes. They are asked to place the
money in different cups illustrating their choice, and the research assistants record the
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answers. By simplifying the tasks in this manner, we ensure that literacy is not a
requirement to participate in the study. The participants were paid for all the tasks in the
experiment, and they were not aware of the tasks to be done before facing them.
To understand the mechanisms underlying the couple’s decision, we elicit time and
risk preferences using two separate tasks. In both tasks, the participants are explicitly
told that neither their spouse nor any other participant will be informed about their
TABLE 1
BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS BY GENDER
Wife Husband Total p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Background
Age 34.95 42.66 38.80 0.000***
(0.45) (0.59) (0.41)
Number of children 3.17
(0.07)





No/some/completed primary 0.38 0.35 0.36 0.508
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Some secondary 0.50 0.39 0.45 0.010**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Completed secondary or more 0.13 0.26 0.19 0.000***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
C. Employment status
Unemployed 0.41 0.05 0.23 0.000***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Self-employed 0.52 0.67 0.60 0.000***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Private sector 0.03 0.20 0.11 0.000***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 287 287 574 574
Notes
The table reports descriptive statistics for parents (age, education, employment status) and households (number
of children, number of children in primary school, chosen child’s gender). Column (1) reports means for wives,
column (2) reports means for husbands, column (3) reports means for the total sample, and column (4) reports
p-values for a two-sided t-test of difference in means between husband and wife.
In panel A, we report background variables for the household. ‘Age’: participant’s reported age. ‘Number of
children’: total number of children the couple cares for. ‘Children in primary’: total number of children the
couple is caring for that are currently attending primary school in Dar es Salaam. ‘Male child’: share of chosen
children that are male.
In panel B, we report education variables. ‘No/some/completed primary’: share of participants who have no
formal schooling, some primary school, or completed primary school as their highest obtained level of
education. ‘Some secondary’: share of participants with some secondary school as their highest obtained level of
education. ‘Completed secondary or more’: share of participants with completed secondary school or higher as
their highest obtained level of education.
In panel C, we report occupation variables. ‘Unemployed’: share of unemployed participants. ‘Self-employed’:
share of self-employed participants. ‘Private sector’: share of participants employed in the formal private sector.
Remaining participants are employed in the formal public sector.
Mean coefficients; standard error of mean in parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
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decision (instructions are provided in Online Appendix D.2). We base the time preference
task on Angerer et al. (2015) and Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) because of its simplicity.
The participants allocate TZS3000 between the day of the experiment and three weeks
later in increments of TZS500. Any amount that they choose to receive after three weeks
is doubled. Earnings from the time preference task are paid out through M-Pesa, an
SMS-based money-transferring system.2
In the risk preference task, based on Gneezy and Potters (1997), the participants
decide how much of TZS3000 they want to keep and how much they want to invest in a
risky option in increments of TZS500. After their decision, the participants draw a card
from a bag to determine whether the invested money is tripled (green card) or reduced to
nothing (red card). They are informed that the probability of winning and losing is the
same. Note that risk-neutral (and risk-seeking) individuals should invest the entire
TZS3000 endowment in the risky option. Thus the risk preference task can be thought of
as a measure of the degree of risk aversion. Earnings from this task are paid out in cash
at the end of the experiment.
In the third task, the couples allocate a TZS15,000 endowment between the wife, the
husband and their child. If a couple has more than one child in primary school, then one
is randomly selected. The name of the chosen child is communicated to the husband and
the wife before they make the decision. For every TZS1500 allocated to the child, the
child receives one week of tutoring. The couples can allocate amounts of TZS0,





















































FIGURE 1. Diagram of experimental design.
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tutoring is ten weeks. The regular price of tuition is TZS5000 per week per child,
implying a multiplier of 3.33. The husband’s and wife’s earnings from the distributive
task are paid out in cash. The allocation to the child is paid out as a certificate for tuition.
At the time of our study, children in the study area attend primary school in the
morning for free. In the afternoon, parents can choose to pay for extra tuition. The
tuition is conducted Monday to Friday from 3 pm to 5 pm. It includes tutoring, a speed
test each day, and a weekend test. The children are taught in groups of 25–40, and the
main focus of the teaching is mathematics, English and science. We wrote contracts with
the tutors teaching the children in each of the four schools. We chose tutoring as the
investment good because it has some general properties that we think are important when
studying allocations to children. It is an investment good that benefits the child and for
which the household has a demand.
Prior to the experiment, we conducted a survey with 120 respondents in an area
similar to the one within which the experiment was conducted. When asked to choose
three items they would have liked to get from a list of 12 items, those related to education
were very popular (57% gave private tutoring, 29% school books, and 10% school
uniform as their first choice). 54% of men and 64% of women indicated tutoring as one
of the three items. Based on this survey, we deduced that both men and women
demanded tutoring. To ensure that the allocation to the child could not easily be undone
after the experiment, we chose to use individualized certificates for tutoring, which are
difficult to sell. Furthermore, as tuition is rather expensive, most of the couples in our
sample could not afford it on a regular basis.
The structure of the distributive task is determined by the treatment to which the
couples were assigned:
Husband Dictator Dictator game with the husband as dictator
Husband Bargaining Rubinstein shrinking-pie bargaining game with the husband as first proposer
Wife Bargaining Rubinstein shrinking-pie bargaining game with the wife as first proposer
Wife Dictator Dictator game with the wife as dictator
In Husband Dictator, the husband decides how to allocate the endowment. He
indicates his allocation decision by dividing the total endowment between three cups: one
with a picture of a woman, one with a picture of a man, and one with a picture of a child.
The participants are required to place all the notes in the different cups, making the fact
that the amount allocated to the husband, the child and the wife must sum to TZS15,000
very salient to them. In all treatments, these cups are taken to the decision-maker’s
spouse by the research assistants, and the decision-makers are aware that the spouse will
be informed about their allocation. In Husband Bargaining and Wife Bargaining, the
first proposer makes a proposal of how to allocate the endowment. The proposal is then
shown to the spouse, who can either agree or disagree. If the spouse agrees, then the
proposal is implemented. Otherwise, the endowment is reduced by TZS500, and he or she
makes a counter-proposal. The couples can go back and forth until an agreement is
reached or there is no money left. We chose the cost of bargaining based on two factors:
(i) to avoid the game continuing indefinitely, and (ii) for the cost to be low so that the
couples did have the possibility to bargain. Wife Dictator is similar to Husband Dictator,
but the wife has the role of dictator.
The treatments are designed to exogenously increase the wife’s bargaining power in
the experiment. When the husband is the dictator, the wife has no bargaining power. In
the two bargaining treatments, the bargaining power is shared between the spouses, but
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the first proposer has the upper hand through a first-mover advantage. Finally, in the
fourth treatment, the wife has complete bargaining power. We refer to the increase in the
wife’s bargaining power as ‘small’ when comparing Husband Dictator to Husband
Bargaining, as ‘intermediate’ when comparing Husband Dictator to Wife Bargaining,
and as ‘large’ when comparing Husband Dictator to Wife Dictator. Note that we cannot
know the exact division of bargaining power in the different treatments, but it is
reasonable to assume that the wife’s bargaining power satisfies Husband Dictator ≤
Husband Bargaining ≤ Wife Bargaining < Wife Dictator. We cannot disentangle the
spouses’ bargaining powers in the experiment and their bargaining powers outside the
lab. However, as we have random assignment to treatment, we can assume that
assignment to treatment is uncorrelated with spouse’s bargaining power outside the lab,
and should therefore not be a main driver of the results.
We chose a Rubinstein shrinking-pie game for the two bargaining treatments to make
them as comparable to the dictator treatments as possible. In this setup, the only
difference between the dictator and bargaining treatments is the receiver’s opportunity to
make a counter-proposal.
Wife’s involvement in decision-making
After respondents finish the time, risk and allocation task, we ask both husband and wife
questions about how the household generally makes decisions. Specifically, we ask them
about who in the household usually has the final say in four decision domains: children’s
education, wife’s health, major household purchases and visiting the wife’s family and
relatives. The possible responses are ‘husband alone’, ‘wife alone’ and ‘husband and wife
together’. These types of questions are used in many household surveys, including the
Demographic and Health Surveys.
The descriptive results from these questions are reported in Table 2. We note
that most of the decisions are taken jointly by husband and wife. Between 62% and
85% of women, and between 72% and 85% of men, report that decisions in each
domain are taken jointly. For both men’s and women’s reporting, a woman is most
likely to make decisions alone when it concerns her own health, while men are most
likely to make decisions about visits to the wife’s family and relatives. Together, the




Wife’s report Husband’s report
Husband Joint Wife Husband Joint Wife
Children’s education 0.13 0.80 0.07 0.13 0.82 0.05
Wife’s health 0.14 0.62 0.24 0.18 0.72 0.11
Major household purchases 0.11 0.85 0.04 0.13 0.85 0.03
Visiting wife’s family/relatives 0.28 0.62 0.10 0.18 0.76 0.06
Notes
The table reports descriptive statistics for the wife’s decision-making power as reported by the wife and the
husband, respectively. Each question asks about the main decision-maker in the different domains.
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A pre-analysis plan was registered at the American Economic Association
Randomized Controlled Trials Registry before we collected the data. This plan
specifies the empirical strategy, including the hypotheses to be tested, the regression
approach, and the dimensions to be studied in the heterogeneity analysis.3 We
present the hypotheses here.
We have several ex ante (pre-specified) hypotheses about the spouses’
preferences and the effect of an increase in the wife’s bargaining power on
allocation to the child. In line with previous literature and policies, our hypotheses
are based on the assumption that women ‘care’ more about their children than
men do. For the main treatment effects, we formulate two hypotheses. First, we
hypothesize (Hypothesis 1) the allocation to the child’s education to be higher in
Wife Dictator than in Husband Dictator (because women care more about the
child). Second, if the household behaves according to a collective household model
(and the wife cares more about the child’s education than the husband), then an
increase in the wife’s bargaining power should increase the allocation to the child’s
education. In other words, we hypothesize (Hypothesis 2) that the allocation to the
child would be highest in Wife Dictator, second highest in Wife Bargaining, third
highest in Husband Bargaining, and lowest in Husband Dictator. Note that this
prediction depends on the model used. A unitary model predicts that the
allocations will remain unchanged regardless of the distribution of bargaining
power. A non-cooperative model, on the other hand, predicts that allocation to the
child is lower in the two bargaining treatments than in the two dictator treatments.
A more thorough discussion of a cooperative and a non-cooperative model can be
found in Section IV.
The second set of hypotheses concerns heterogeneous treatment effects. Ex ante, we
hypothesize that differences in time and risk preferences between spouses affect the
treatment effects (see, for example, Schaner 2015). Specifically, we expect that being more
patient is positively associated with the allocation to the child’s education. Therefore,
giving the more patient spouse more bargaining power has a stronger effect on allocation
to the child compared to when the less patient spouse is given more bargaining power. If
the wife is more patient than the husband, then an increase in her bargaining power
should have a larger (positive) effect on the allocation to the child than if she is less
patient than the husband (Hypothesis 3). Similarly, we also posit that more risk-averse
individuals would allocate less to the child (if the returns to investing in a child’s
education are perceived to be uncertain). Therefore, if the wife is more risk-averse than
the husband, then we expect that giving her more bargaining power has a smaller effect
on the allocation to the child than if she is less risk-averse than the husband (Hypothesis
4). We are also testing the ex post hypothesis that the gender of the child affects the
allocation. Based on previous literature, we expect that men favour boys and that women
favour girls (Gupta et al. 2003). Thus if the chosen child is a girl, the effect of increasing
the wife’s bargaining power has a larger (positive) effect than if the child is a boy
(Hypothesis 5).
II. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
In this section, we provide the empirical strategy for the main analysis and the
heterogeneity analysis.
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Main analysis
We first investigate whether an increase in the wife’s bargaining power increases the share
allocated to the child (Hypotheses 1 and 2) by estimating the regression
yc ¼ aþ bHBHusband Bargainingc þ bWBWife Bargainingc
þ bWDWife Dictatorc þ dSSþ dXXc þ ec;
ð1Þ
where yc is the share of the endowment allocated to the child for couple c, a is a constant,
Husband Bargainingc, Wife Bargainingc and Wife Dictatorc are treatment dummies
taking value 1 if couple c is in Husband Bargaining, Wife Bargaining and Wife Dictator,
respectively, S is a set of indicator variables for each session, Xc is a vector of background
variables, and ɛc is the error term.
4 Vector Xc consists of child and parent background
variables (including time and risk preferences) as well as intrahousehold differences in
education, and time and risk preferences (the variables are defined in Table 4). All
regressions are estimated with ordinary least squares and robust standard errors.
Tables A.1 and A.2 in Online Appendix A report balance regressions for spouse and
child background variables. Overall, the treatments are well-balanced. In terms of time
and risk preferences, however, we find imbalances between treatments (see Online
Appendix Table A.3).
Husband Dictator is the reference category in equation (1), and we interpret the
estimated treatment effects relative to a situation where the husband has complete
bargaining power. From equation (1), we obtain estimates of the causal effect on yc of a
small (bHB), intermediate (bWB) and large (bWD) increase in the wife’s bargaining power.
We also estimate equation (1) for yHc and yWc, the shares allocated to the husband and
the wife, respectively. Note that these regressions were not specified in the pre-analysis plan.
Finally, we do a set of robustness tests. The rationale behind these and the results can
be found in Online Appendix B. In the results section, we mention the results for the
robustness checks only if these are different from those reported in the main analysis.
Heterogeneity analysis
To shed light on the underlying mechanisms affecting the allocation to the child’s
education, we study heterogeneity in the treatment effects. To do this, we use the elicited
preferences and background data collected in the survey. We focus on time and risk
preferences, and the gender of the child. In particular, we test whether the treatment
effect is different for couples where (i) the husband is more patient (Hypothesis 3), (ii) the
husband is less risk averse (Hypothesis 4), and (iii) the chosen child is a boy (Hypothesis
5). The analysis of the pre-specified heterogeneity dimensions not reported in the main
analysis is reported in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) of Table A.5 in Online Appendix A.5
We estimate the following regression for each of the three dimensions, separately:
yc ¼ aþ bVarVarc
þ bHBHusband Bargainingc þ hHBHusband Bargaining Varc
þ bWBWife Bargainingc þ hWBWife Bargaining Varc
þ bWDWife Dictatorc þ hHDWife Dictator  Varc
þ dSSþ dXXc þ ec;
ð2Þ
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where Varc is an indicator variable for couples where the husband is more patient or less
risk averse, or couples where the chosen child is a boy, and Husband Bargaining 9 Varc,
Wife Bargaining 9 Varc and Wife Dictator 9 Varc are interaction terms between the
indicator variable and the respective treatment indicator variables.
On the basis of these regressions, we study whether there are significant differences in
treatment effects between subgroups. The estimated subgroup difference in the causal
effect of small, intermediate and large increases in female bargaining power are given by
hHB, hWB and hWD. As an illustration, if Varc is an indicator variable for the husband
being more patient than the wife, then the estimate hWD shows whether the effect of a
large increase in female bargaining power is different for couples where the husband is
more patient than the wife and couples where he is not.
III. RESULTS
We first provide descriptive results for the allocation decisions made for the household
endowment and in the time and risk preferences tasks. Next, we report the main analysis
of the treatment effects on the share allocated to the child, and on the share allocated to
the wife and the husband, respectively. We then discuss heterogeneous treatment effects.
Allocation decisions
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for allocations to the child, husband and wife, and
for allocations to the future and the risky option for the husband and the wife,
respectively. On average, the couples allocate a share of 0.34 to the child. Moreover, the
mean share allocated to the husband, 0.29, is significantly smaller than the mean share
allocated to the wife, 0.37 (p < 0.001). In terms of time and risk preferences, the
husbands in our sample are significantly more patient (p = 0.094) and less risk averse
than the wives (p < 0.001).
In Figure 2, we display intrahousehold differences in patience and risk aversion.
Couples are sorted into six categories: husband most patient/least risk averse, husband
and wife equally patient/risk averse, and wife most patient/least risk averse. The figure
illustrates that there is large variation in the differences in time and risk preferences
between spouses. In about 84% of the couples, the husband and the wife have different
time preferences, and about 80% have different risk preferences.
Main analysis
Table 4 reports regressions for comparisons of Husband Dictator with the three other
treatments (see Tables A.6–A.8 in Online Appendix A for extended regression tables). In
column (1), we include only the treatment indicator variables Husband Bargaining, Wife
Bargaining and Wife Dictator. In columns (2)–(5), we sequentially add session fixed
effects and background variables. We focus on the full specification in column (5). We do
not find a significant effect of a small or a large increase in the wife’s bargaining power.
However, an intermediate increase in the wife’s bargaining power significantly reduces
the share allocated to the child’s education. The descriptive results on treatment effects
are in line with the regression analyses, and are reported in Online Appendix C.
In terms of background variables, we find a positive, but small, effect of the
husband’s age and a negative effect of the wife’s age. Note that the effect of the wife’s age
is not robust to using the final share in Table B.1 of Online Appendix B.
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Based on this regression, we formulate the following main result.
Result 1 Increasing the wife’s bargaining power relative to Husband Dictator does not
increase the allocation to the child’s education (bHB ¼ 0:022, p = 0.577, bWB ¼ 0:079,
p = 0.044, bWD ¼ 0:004, p = 0.901; see column (5) of Table 4).
Result 1 suggests that we can reject Hypotheses 1 and 2. In fact, an intermediate
increase in the wife’s bargaining power reduces the allocation. As there is no significant
difference between Husband Dictator and Wife Dictator, this is likely not a consequence
of different preferences when it comes to allocation to the child’s education, but rather
due to some other aspects of the bargaining situation (see Section IV for a discussion).
Next, we consider the effect of increasing the wife’s bargaining power on the share
allocated to the wife and the husband in Table 5. Both columns show the full
specification where all background variables and the indicator variables are included. A
TABLE 3
ALLOCATION DECISIONS
Mean S.D. 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
Allocation to child 0.34 0.22 0.20 0.30 0.40
Allocation to wife 0.37 0.19 0.27 0.33 0.43
Allocation to husband 0.29 0.18 0.17 0.30 0.40
Share invested in future, husband 0.74 0.26 0.67 0.67 1.00
Share invested in future, wife 0.70 0.28 0.50 0.67 1.00
Share invested in risky option, husband 0.70 0.28 0.50 0.67 1.00
Share invested in risky option, wife 0.59 0.29 0.33 0.50 0.83
Notes
The table displays the mean, standard deviation, 1st quartile, median and 3rd quartile for shares allocated to
child, husband and wife, as well as for the share allocated to the future and share allocated to the risky option by






















Husband less risk averse
Equally risk averse
Wife less risk averse
FIGURE 2. Time and risk preferences between husband and wife.
Notes: The figure provides a simplified illustration of differences in time and risk preferences between the
husband and the wife. Couples are divided into three categories: husband most patient/least risk averse,
husband and wife equally patient/risk averse and wife most patient/least risk averse. Time preferences are
measured by the share allocated to the futre and the fraction of couples in each of the three categories is
illustrated in the left panel. Risk preferences are measured by the share allocated to the risky option and the
fraction of couples in each of the three categories is illustrated in the right panel.
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EFFECT OF INCREASING THE WIFE’S BARGAINING POWER ON THE ALLOCATION TO THE
CHILD’S EDUCATION
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Husband Bargaining 0.012 0.016 0.021 0.026 0.022
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039)
Wife Bargaining 0.103*** 0.100*** 0.096*** 0.080** 0.079**
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.039)
Wife Dictator 0.019 0.019 0.015 0.003 0.004
(0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032)
Male child 0.020 0.037 0.036
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Chosen child’s standard 0.001 0.006 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Age, husband 0.003** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.002)
Age, wife 0.004* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002)
Husband more patient 0.050
(0.045)
Husband less risk averse 0.067
(0.042)
Session fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child background No No Yes Yes Yes
Parent background No No No Yes Yes
Parent difference No No No No Yes
HB vs. WB 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.023 0.028
WB vs. WD 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.019 0.021
HB vs. WD 0.385 0.334 0.331 0.537 0.637
Couples 287 287 285 284 284
R2 0.031 0.115 0.124 0.199 0.210
Notes
The table reports regressions of the share allocated to the child (with possible discrete values 0,0.1,0.2,. . .,0.9,1)
on the treatment variables: ‘Husband Bargaining’ (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Husband
Bargaining), ‘Wife Bargaining’ (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining), ‘Wife
Dictator’ (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator), and a set of explanatory variables.
‘Session fixed effects’: indicator variables for each of the 11 different sessions of the experiments.
‘Child background’ is as follows. ‘Male child’: indicator variable taking the value 1 if the child is a boy. ‘Chosen
child’s standard’: variable taking values corresponding to the chosen child’s school standard between 1 and 7.
‘Children total’: indicator variable for couples with two or more children. We also include indicator variables
for which of the four schools the child is attending.
‘Parent background’ is as follows. ‘Agei’ (i = H,W, H = husband, W = wife): count variable for reported age of
individual i. ‘Self-employedi’: indicator variable taking the value 1 if i is self-employed. ‘Highest level of educationi’:
discrete variable taking the values 0 = No formal education, 1 = Some primary school, 2 = Primary school completed,
3 = Some primary school, 4 = Secondary school completed, 5 = More than secondary school. ‘Share allocated to
futurei’: share allocated to the future by i. ‘Share invested in risky optioni’: share allocated to the risky option by i.
‘Parent difference’ variables are as follows. ‘Husband most educated’: indicator variable taking the value 1 for
couples where the husband is more educated than the wife. ‘Husband most patient’: indicator variable taking
the value 1 for couples where the husband allocates more to the future than the wife. ‘Husband least risk averse’:
indicator variable taking the value 1 if the husband allocates more to the risky option than the wife.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
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large increase in the wife’s bargaining power increases the share allocated to her and
decreases the share allocated to the husband. The share allocated to the husband is not
affected by a small or intermediate increase in the wife’s bargaining power. An
intermediate increase in the wife’s bargaining power increases the share allocated to her,
but the effect is not robust to the specification using the final share allocated to the wife
(see Table B.5 in Online Appendix B).
TABLE 5
EFFECT OF INCREASING THE WIFE’S BARGAINING POWER ON THE ALLOCATIONS TO WIFE
AND HUSBAND
Allocation to wife Allocation to husband
(1) (2)
Husband Bargaining 0.017 0.007
(0.031) (0.035)
Wife Bargaining 0.066** 0.003
(0.031) (0.035)
Wife Dictator 0.092*** 0.104***
(0.028) (0.031)
Male child 0.003 0.037
(0.025) (0.023)
Chosen child’s standard 0.004 0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
Age, husband 0.000 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Age, wife 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Husband more patient 0.038 0.074*
(0.037) (0.039)
Husband less risk averse 0.034 0.037
(0.040) (0.039)
Session fixed effects Yes Yes
Child background Yes Yes
Parent background Yes Yes
Parent difference Yes Yes
HB vs. WB 0.019 0.771
WB vs. WD 0.412 0.000




The table reports a regression of the share allocated to the wife (with possible discrete values 0, 0.033, 0.67,
0.1,. . .,0.933, 0.967, 1) in column (1), and a regression of the share allocated to the husband (with possible
discrete values 0, 0.033, 0.67, 0.1,. . .,0.933, 0.967, 1) in column (2) on the treatment variables ‘Husband
Bargaining’ (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining), ‘Wife Bargaining’
(indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining), ‘Wife Dictator’ (indicator variable taking
the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator), and a set of explanatory variables.
See Table 4 for the definitions of ‘Session fixed effects’, ‘Child background’, ‘Parent background’ and ‘Parent
difference’.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
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Based on these regressions, we formulate the following result for the allocation to
husband and wife.
Result 2 A large increase in the wife’s bargaining power increases the allocation to her
and reduces the allocation to the husband (bWD ¼ 0:092, p = 0.001, see column (1) of
Table 5; and bWD ¼ 0:104, p = 0.001, see column (2) of Table 5). An intermediate
increase in the wife’s bargaining power increases the allocation to her, but does not affect
the allocation to the husband (bWB ¼ 0:066, p = 0.038, see column (1) of Table 5; and
bWB ¼ 0:003, p = 0.920, see column (2) of Table 5).
Result 2 shows that giving the wife full bargaining power benefits her. Together,
Results 1 and 2 indicate that in our study, increasing the wife’s bargaining power benefits
her economically, but does not increase investments in children’s education.
Heterogeneity analysis
In this subsection, we investigate whether different types of couples are affected
differently by an increase in the wife’s bargaining power. Because we have smaller
samples, and therefore less power, in the bargaining treatments, we focus on
heterogeneities in the effect of a large increase in the wife’s bargaining power.
Column (1) of Table 6 considers whether the effect of increasing the wife’s bargaining
power on the allocation to the child’s education is different between couples where the
husband is more patient than the wife and couples where the wife is at least as patient as
the husband (see Table A.4 in Online Appendix A for tests of equality of the coefficients
of the treatments). In line with Hypothesis 3, we find that it is. When the wife is at least as
patient as the husband, a large increase in bargaining power increases the share allocated
to the child’s education by 7.7 percentage points. Conversely, when the husband is more
patient than the wife, a large increase in the wife’s bargaining power decreases the
allocation to the child’s education by 11.5 percentage points. These results are robust to
using alternative definitions of the difference in time preferences (see Table B.6 in Online
Appendix B). Based on the regression in column (1), we formulate the following result for
differences in time preferences between the husband and the wife.
Result 3 The effect of a large increase in the wife’s bargaining power is dependent on
the intrahousehold difference in time preferences. When the husband is more patient than
the wife, a large increase in the wife’s bargaining power reduces the allocation to the
child’s education (hWD þ bWD ¼ 0:115, p = 0.022). When the wife is at least as patient
as the husband, a large increase in her bargaining power increases the allocation to the
child’s education (bWD ¼ 0:077, p = 0.074).
Next, we consider differences in risk preferences between the husband and the wife in
column (2) of Table 6. We find that the effect of a large increase in the wife’s bargaining
power is not different between couples where the husband is less risk averse than the wife
and couples where the wife is less risk averse than (or as risk averse as) the husband
(rejecting Hypothesis 4).
The findings on differences in risk preferences can be summed up as follows.
Result 4 The intrahousehold difference in risk preferences makes no difference to the
effect of a large increase in the wife’s bargaining power (bWD ¼ 0:017, p = 0.745 and
hWD þ bWD ¼ 0:020, p = 0.631).
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TABLE 6
HETEROGENEITY IN TIME AND RISK PREFERENCES DIFFERENCES, AND GENDER OF THE
CHILD
Var
Husband most patient Husband least risk averse Male child
(1) (2) (3)
Var 0.101* 0.077 0.119**
(0.056) (0.059) (0.046)
Husband Bargaining 0.004 0.037 0.084*
(0.079) (0.058) (0.047)
Wife Bargaining 0.054 0.081 0.028
(0.050) (0.058) (0.047)
Wife Dictator 0.077 0.017 0.054
(0.043) (0.053) (0.040)
Husband Bargaining9 Var 0.040 0.135* 0.173**
(0.094) (0.079) (0.082)
Wife Bargaining9 Var 0.032 0.003 0.110
(0.084) (0.075) (0.076)
Wife Dictator9 Var 0.191*** 0.037 0.115*
(0.065) (0.068) (0.064)
Husband Bargaining (Var) 0.036 0.098* 0.089
(0.045) (0.053) (0.066)
Wife Bargaining (Var) 0.085 0.083 0.138**
(0.065) (0.051) (0.062)
Wife Dictator (Var) 0.115** 0.020 0.061
(0.050) (0.041) (0.051)
Session fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Child background Yes Yes Yes
Parent background Yes Yes Yes
Parent difference Yes Yes Yes
Couples 284 284 284
R2 0.243 0.226 0.229
Notes
The table reports heterogeneity regressions of the share allocated to the child (with possible discrete values
0,0.1,0.2,. . .,0.9,1) on the treatment variables. Column (1) reports a regression with ‘Husband most patient’
(indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband allocates more to the future than the wife),
interaction terms between the treatment indicator variables and ‘Husband most patient’: ‘Husband Bargaining
9 Husband most patient’, ‘Wife Bargaining 9 Husband most patient’ and ‘Wife Dictator 9 Husband most
patient’, and a set of explanatory variables. Columns (2) and (3) report similar regressions for the indicator
variables ‘Husband least risk averse’ (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband
allocates more to the risky option than the wife) and ‘Male child’ (indicator variable taking the value 1 for
couples where the child randomly chosen to receive tutoring was male), respectively. ‘Treatment (Husband most
patient)’: sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator variable and ‘Treatment 9 Husband most
patient’. ‘Treatment (Husband least risk averse)’: sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator
variable and ‘Treatment 9 Husband least risk averse’. ‘Treatment (Male child)’: sum of estimated parameters
for the treatment indicator variable and ‘Treatment9Male child’.
See Table 4 for definition of ‘Session fixed effects’, ‘Child background’, ‘Parent background’ and ‘Parent
difference’.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
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Finally, we consider the gender of the child in column (3) of Table 6. The significant
coefficient of the interaction term ‘Wife Dictator 9 Var’ shows that the effect of a large
increase in the wife’s bargaining power is significantly different between couples where the
child is female and couples where the child is male. A large increase in the wife’s bargaining
power reduces the allocation for couples where the child is male, and increases the
allocation for couples where the child is female, though these effects are not statistically
significant. Figure 3 illustrates the mean share allocated to the child’s education by gender
of the child, for Husband Dictator and Wife Dictator, respectively, and sheds more light
on these results. It shows that in Husband Dictator, couples allocate significantly more to
male than female children (p = 0.088), whereas there is no gender difference in Wife
Dictator (p = 0.737). This is partly in line with Hypothesis 5. Returning to Table 6, it also
shows that a small increase in the wife’s bargaining power affects male and female children
differently, but due to the low number of observations in the bargaining treatments, these
results should be interpreted with care. Based on the regression results, we formulate the
following result on the importance of the gender of the child.
Result 5 In Husband Dictator, more is allocated to male than female children
(bVar ¼ 0:119, p = 0.010). In Wife Dictator, there are no gender differences in allocation
to children’s education (hWD þ bWD ¼ 0:061, p = 0.202).
Result 3 provides evidence that the time preferences of the spouse with the upper hand
in the bargaining situation are important, whereas Result 1 shows that gender of the

























Husband Dictator Wife Dictator
Female child Male child
FIGURE 3. Shares allocated to the child in dictator treatments, by gender of child.
Notes: The figure illustrates the mean shares allocated to female and male children in Husband Dictator and
Wife Dictator, respectively.
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attribute in determining the allocation to the child. Finally, Result 5 shows that increasing
the wife’s bargaining power makes allocations to boys’ and girls’ education more equal.
IV. DISCUSSION
This section consists of three parts. First, we link Results 1 and 2 to theories on
household decision-making. We also discuss how we can understand the reduction in the
allocation to the child in Wife Bargaining. Second, we investigate potential confounding
factors that can influence our results with a focus on women’s bargaining power outside
of the lab. Third, we discuss some limitations of the study.
Explaining bargaining results
Theoretical framework There exist several strategies to model household behaviour and
within-household distribution of resources. Common to all these approaches is that children
are modelled as a household public good. LetUs(qw,qh,Q) denote the utility function of spouse
s (s 2 {w,h}). Here, qw and qh denote the wife’s and the husband’s private consumption, and
Q is the public good (i.e. the allocation to the child). U() is increasing concave in all elements
and allows for caring between spouses. In the following, we will distinguish between two main
classes of household models, namely the cooperative and non-cooperative classes.
In the household decision-making literature, the collective model as developed by
Chiappori (1988, 1992) is the most commonly used cooperative model (Browning et al.




lUwðqw; qh;QÞ þ ð1 lÞUhðqw; qh;QÞ;
where l and (1l) are the bargaining powers of the wife and the husband, respectively. If
the wife and the husband have different preferences over the allocation to the child, Q,
then a change in the distribution of bargaining power will lead to a monotonic change in
the allocation to the child. Specifically, if the wife has a stronger preference for the
allocation to the child than the husband does, then an increase in l leads to a monotonic
increase in the allocation to the child. If, on the other hand, the wife and the husband
have the same preferences over the allocation to the child, then changes in l will not
affect the allocation. The allocation to the wife (husband) monotonically increases
(decreases) in the wife’s bargaining power assuming that both spouses care more about
their own consumption than their spouse’s consumption.
In a non-cooperative framework, a natural process to consider is a voluntary
contribution game in which each spouse contributes to the public good, and spends the
rest on private consumption. The decision-making process is then characterized by the
two spouses solving the following:
max
qw;w;qh;w;Qw
fUwðqw; qh;Qw þQhÞ s.t. PQw þ qw;w þ qh;w ¼ Ywg;
max
qw;h;qh;h;Qh
fUhðqw; qh;Qw þQhÞ s.t. PQh þ qw;h þ qh;h ¼ Yhg;
where Ys is the income of spouse s,Qs is the contribution to the public good of spouse s, qw,
s is the contribution to the wife’s private consumption of spouse s, qh,s is the contribution to
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the husband’s private consumption of spouse s, and P is the price of the public good (price
of private consumption is normalized to 1). Bargaining power is measured as relative
income. As shown by Browning et al. (2009), the outcome of this decision-making process
leads to underprovision of the public good for certain distributions of income and
therefore a non-monotonic change in the allocation to the child.
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of increasing the wife’s bargaining power on the allocation
to the public good. If the husband has all the income, then he allocates Qh to the child and
makes a transfer to the wife equivalent to qw,h. As the wife’s income increases up to y1, the
husband gradually decreases his transfers to the wife’s private consumption while the wife
uses her income on her own private consumption. There are no changes in the allocation to
the child. Between y1 and y2, the husband decreases his contribution to the public good
while the wife is not yet contributing. Therefore the allocation to the child is reduced.
Between y2 and y3, both spouses contribute to the public good, and a decrease in the
husband’s contribution to the public good is exactly offset by an increase in the wife’s
contribution. Thus we have an area of local income pooling where an increase in the wife’s
income share does not affect the allocation to the child. After y3, the husband stops
contributing to the public good, while the wife continues to increase her contributions. The
dashed line displays the case where the wife has a stronger preference for the public good
than the husband, and the solid line displays the case where the wife and the husband have
similar preferences. Finally, above y4, the wife starts to make transfers to the husband (i.e.
yh,w > 0), and keeps the allocation to the public good constant.
In the experiment, we manipulated not the income, but the bargaining process. Therefore
a non-cooperative framework based on a voluntary contribution mechanism might seem
misleading. Basu (2006) uses a cooperative bargaining framework with a non-cooperative
element. Specifically, the spouses’ bargaining powers depend in part on an endogenous
decision. Using the example of child labour (a public bad), Basu (2006) shows that decisions
can be non-monotonic in a spouse’s bargaining power. The intuition is similar to the voluntary
contributions model. Thus even if Basu (2006) uses a cooperative bargaining framework, the
outcome is inefficient because of the non-cooperative ingredient (Browning et al. 2014).
Results 1 and 2 in light of the theory The theory shows that in both a non-cooperative
and a cooperative framework we would expect a monotonic increase in the allocation to
Allocation to child
Wife’s income
sharey1 y2 y3 y4
FIGURE 4. Non-cooperative model.
Note: The figure displays the predictions for the allocation to the child in a non-cooperative framework.
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the wife as her bargaining power increases, and a monotonic decrease in the husband’s
allocation. Figure C.2 in Online Appendix C illustrates the allocations to the child, the
wife and the husband. The allocation to the wife displays a monotonic increase in the
wife’s bargaining power, and the allocation to the husband displays a monotonic
decrease in the wife’s bargaining power. This is in line with the theoretical predictions.
Result 1 shows that an increase in the wife’s bargaining power does not increase the
allocation to the child. The share allocated to the child is not significantly different
between the two dictator treatments. This indicates that men and women do not have
different preferences when it comes to spending on children’s education. If this finding
generalizes to other domains, then it offers a potential explanation for why recent RCTs
do not find differential effects for cash transfers to men and women. Moreover, an
intermediate increase decreases the allocation to the child.
The changes in the allocations to the child are perhaps puzzling. However, a non-
monotonic change in the allocation to the child can be reconciled with a non-cooperative
framework. A possible explanation for the non-monotonic change in the allocation to the
child is that the wife wants to avoid that the husband rejects her proposal, and that she
underestimates his preferences for allocation to the child. Thus she gives more to the
husband and less to the child than in Wife Dictator. This explanation is in line with
previous studies showing that the wives tend to underestimate the husbands’ preferences
for a public good (Kebede et al. 2014) and studies showing that spouses have inaccurate
beliefs about each other’s preferences (Bateman and Munro 2005; Afzal et al. 2018;
D’Exelle and Ringdal 2020). Comparing allocations in Husband Dictator to allocations
in Husband Bargaining, on the other hand, we find no significant differences in
allocations to child, husband and wife. The finding that a wife acts differently in the role
as first proposer compared to in the role as dictator can be explained by a woman being
more concerned about making her husband happy so that he will accept the proposal.
Confounding factors
Some aspects of the experimental design warrant caution in interpretation of the
treatment effects.
First, we do not have information on how the spouses plan to spend the amount that
they allocate to themselves, and cannot rule out that either of them prefers to spend their
money on other goods for their children, such as clothing and food. If women spend
more of the money that they allocate to themselves on goods and services that benefit
children than men do, then our results could be consistent with the notion that increasing
the wife’s bargaining power leads to higher investments in children.
Second, we do not have information on what happens in the interaction between the
spouses after the experiment. Thus we cannot address what Munro (2018) refers to as the
‘undoing problem’: the actions taken in the lab may be offset in subsequent interactions. On
the one hand, the allocations made in the lab can potentially be changed after the experiment.
In the context of our experiment, because the allocation to the child was paid out as an
individualized certificate for tutoring, undoing it is difficult. In terms of allocations to the
husband and wife, we cannot rule out undoing. On the other hand, the allocations made to the
child in the lab might lead the household to reallocate money that they planned to use on
education for that child to something else that does not necessarily benefit him or her. We limit
this problem by choosing an investment good that many households cannot normally afford.
Third, the effect of the treatments may depend on the real distribution of bargaining
power within the household. For example, if the wife has low bargaining power and
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believes that the husband might change the allocation that she makes in the lab, then she
might allocate more to the child as this is paid out in kind. However, because we have
random assignment to treatments, such differences should not be driving our results. To
study whether households where the wife has a higher intrahousehold bargaining power
respond differently to an increase in the wife’s bargaining power in the experiment, we
conduct a heterogeneity analysis using the wife’s employment status as a proxy for her
intrahousehold bargaining power. The results are reported in Table A.5 of Online
Appendix A, and show that there is no difference in the effect of the Wife Dictator
treatment between couples in which the wife is unemployed (less bargaining power) and
couples where she is employed (more bargaining power). We conducted a similar analysis
using the decision-making questions described in the third subsection of Section I as a
proxy for the wife’s bargaining power. In the analysis, we use both an indicator variable
for whether the wife was involved in decisions about children’s education and an index
based on all four decision domains. We find no differential effects between couples where
the wife is more or less involved in household decision-making, but due to small variation
in responses, this analysis is underpowered.
Fourth, the in-kind nature of the allocation to the child may affect the behaviour in
the lab. The amount allocated to the child is committed to tutoring and difficult to
liquidate. This can explain why parents do not allocate everything to the child, despite
the high multiplier. This is not an issue if the in-kind nature of the investment good
affects men and women equally as we would then see only a reduction in the level of
investment, but no effect on the treatment differences. If, on the other hand, the in-kind
nature of the allocation to the child affects women differently from men, then the
treatment differences from the analysis might be misleading. This would be particularly
the case if the wife has less access to liquidity and takes the opportunity in the experiment
to get a higher cash payment at the expense of the investment in children. To test this, we
can use the wife’s employment status as a proxy for her liquidity constraint. If the wife is
unemployed, then she has limited access to money for herself. However, as shown in
Table A.5 of Online Appendix A, whether or not the wife is unemployed does not
influence the treatment differences. Therefore we do not think that the in-kind nature of
the allocation to the child affects the treatment differences.
Finally, all participants conducted the time and risk preferences in the same order,
and before they made the household allocation decisions. The lack of randomization of
tasks could potentially affect our results, because how much the household earns in the
time and risk preferences task could potentially affect how much is invested in the child.
For instance, households who won the risk lottery may be more inclined to invest in the
child. To investigate this possibility, we conduct robustness checks in which we control
for whether the main decision-maker won in the risk preference task, how much the main
decision-maker earned in the risk preference task and how much the main decision-
maker earned in total in the time and risk preferences task together, respectively, in
Table B.4 of Online Appendix B. We do not find that controlling for the earnings of the
main decision-maker changes the results, or is significantly correlated with the allocations
to children.
Limitations
While conducting a lab experiment has the advantage of cleanly identifying causal effects
and underlying mechanisms, our research design also has some important limitations. In
this subsection, we discuss these in more detail.
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Our study design gives rise to two potential threats to external validity. First, in the
experiment, we investigate the effect of an increase in experimental control over a
household endowment, which we consider as a proxy for bargaining power in the lab.
Whether our findings can be generalized to increases in the wife’s bargaining power
outside the lab is an empirical question that the present study cannot answer. However, a
handful of studies show that, in general, spouses’ behaviour in the lab correlates well with
field behaviour (Hoel 2015; Schaner 2015; Zou 2015; Barr et al. 2017; Fiala 2017; Hoel
et al. 2017).
Second, our invitation-based recruitment procedure is a potential source of selection
bias, which may affect the degree to which we can expect our findings to apply to the
general population. We do not know how many invitation letters were sent out and
therefore we do not know the fraction of couples that chose to participate. In addition,
we do not know whether the couples that signed up for the study are different from the
couples that did not sign up.
Furthermore, there might be a selection bias in terms of the gender of the child. For
example, couples with boys might be more likely to sign up than couples with girls
because they believe that investments in boys have higher returns. However, when the
couples were invited to the experiment, they were told only that the experiment was
about household decision-making, and education was not mentioned. Furthermore, we
do not see significant differences in the gender composition of children between sessions,
or between couples with one child in primary school and couples with more children in
primary school.
Finally, all the couples that received an invitation to participate have at least one
child in primary school and are, as such, already investing in their child(ren)’s education.
While there are no school fees for public primary schools in Tanzania, parents have to
pay for school materials (UNESCO 2011). This can affect the allocation to the child in
two ways. On one hand, it is plausible that our sample is generally more willing to invest
in their children’s education than the general population who have children of primary
school age. If this is the case, then they may allocate more to their children in our
experiment than parents who are not letting their children attend primary school would.
On the other hand, our respondents might be less willing to allocate to the child in the
experiment because they are already investing in their children’s education outside of the
experiment. We do not expect a potential bias from inviting only couples with children
already in school to be large in our sample because the primary school enrolment and
attendance rates in Tanzania are generally high. In the population census from 2012,
91.6% of children between ages 7 and 13 were currently attending school (Tanzania
National Bureau of Statistics 2015) in Dar es Salaam. In line with this number, the
Demographic and Health Survey from 2015–16 reports that 88.5% of the school-age
population were currently attending primary school (Tanzania National Bureau of
Statistics 2016, p. 44).
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our paper studies the effect of an increase in the wife’s bargaining power on couples’
spending on children’s education. We do not find any evidence that such a change in
relative bargaining power increases the share allocated to the child. This finding
challenges not only earlier studies such as those by Thomas (1990, 1993), but also the
general view among policymakers that increasing female bargaining power leads to
higher household spending on children. However, we acknowledge that the outcome that
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we study—spending allocations to children’s education—is a particular type of
investment. We do not know whether our results generalize to other types of investments,
such as investments in children’s nutrition. Our results further suggest that it is the
attributes of the main decision-maker (time preferences) and the child (gender of the
child), not the gender of the decision-maker, that matter.
We show that time preferences play an important role in household decision-making.
This is in line with Schaner (2015), who finds that couples that have similar time
preferences are more likely to choose the most efficient savings account than couples who
have different time preferences. In particular, when one spouse has complete bargaining
power, it is better for the child that it is the most patient spouse. This finding is in line
with previous studies; Ahiakpor and Swaray (2015) find a positive association between
male household heads’ patience and investments in children’s education in rural Ghana.
Tanaka and Yamano (2015) also find that the more patient the household head is, the
higher are the educational expenditures in Uganda. In our sample, men tend to be more
patient than women, implying that, on average, it is more beneficial for investments in
children’s education if the husband is the main decision-maker.
We also show that husbands allocate more money to boys than to girls. Wives, on the
other hand, allocate the same amount to boys and girls. The result is partly consistent
with previous studies; Dizon-Ross and Jayachandran (2015) find that in rural Uganda,
men favour boys, but also that women favour girls, and Raley and Bianchi (2006) find
that in the USA, men spend more time with boys than with girls, whereas women spend
as much time with boys as they spend with girls. Including women in the decision-making
process by increasing their bargaining power gives a more gender-equal allocation to the
children in our study, and in the long run, female empowerment may consequently lead
to societies becoming more gender-equal.
The results presented in this paper point to several avenues for future research. First,
studying the spouses’ preferences, such as time preferences and risk preferences, seems to
be important in future research in order to increase our understanding of the underlying
mechanisms determining household behaviour. Second, considering other types of
spending on children, such as on nutrition and health, is important in order to
understand the generalizability of our study. Finally, while random assignment of
couples to different treatments ensures internal validity, the sample is not necessarily
representative. Recent randomized controlled trials have taken a step towards testing the
generalizability of our and other experimental results, but have, to our knowledge, not
studied the role of time preferences and gender of the child.
Our study suggests that increased spending on children’s education might not be an
instrumental reason for targeting women with cash transfers, but gender equality (among
both children and adults) might. Thus it is of great importance to understand how we can
most efficiently target poor children.
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NOTES
1. The correlations might be misleading for two reasons. First, a woman’s education or earnings could be
correlated with unobserved dimensions of ability, family background and society that potentially can directly
determine children’s welfare. Second, the comparison of the effects of men’s versus women’s earnings or
education can be correlated with unobserved characteristics of men (e.g. more educated women marry more
educated men who care more about their children). For a full discussion, see Duflo (2012).
2. M-Pesa is an SMS-based money-transferring system allowing an individual to deposit, withdraw and transfer
money with a phone. The receiver could easily liquidate this money, or use it to pay bills such as phone and
electricity bills. To ensure that allocations to the day of the experiment do not reflect a preference for cash
over mobile money, both payments in the time-preference task are made using M-Pesa. To make sure that
the payments were given to the spouse making the decision, we asked them to give us their personal M-Pesa
numbers. In 48 couples (equally distributed across treatments), the husband and the wife provided us with
the same number. For these, we do not know whether the number belonged to the husband or to the wife.
We do not find any difference in the spouses’ time preferences or the time-preference gap for couples who
reported different phone numbers compared to couples who reported the same number. Furthermore,
dropping couples reporting the same number from the analysis does not significantly change our results.
Note that only the time-preference task was paid out using M-Pesa.
3. See https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/770 (accessed 19 August 2020).
4. We deviate slightly from the pre-analysis plan, where we specified equation (1) with one indicator variable for
the two bargaining treatments. When designing the experiment, we did not think the gender of the first
proposer would matter. However, we find that it does, and have therefore chosen to analyse Husband
Bargaining and Wife Bargaining separately. Due to logistic challenges in recruiting participants, we collected
about two-thirds of the planned sample size.
5. Note that our definition of the decision-making dummies deviates slightly from the pre-analysis plan. We use
indicator variables taking value 1 if the wife is involved in decisions about children’s education (i.e. decision is
made jointly or by the wife alone), instead of indicator variables taking value 1 if the wife participates in more
than two of the four decisions that we ask about, because we perceive education decisions to be the most relevant.
In addition to the decision-making dummies, Table A.5 in Online Appendix A reports results for two alternative
measures of decision-making power, namely wife’s employment status (column (3)) and the first factor of a factor
analysis of the discrete responses (‘husband alone’ = 1, ‘husband and wife together’ = 2, and ‘wife alone’ = 3) to
questions about the four areas of decision-making as reported by the wife and the husband, respectively.
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